We introduce a novel private-key quantum money scheme where the verification of a note is based on Sampling Matching, a problem in one-way communication complexity model introduced by Kumar et al. [KKD18]. Our scheme involves the honest Bank who prepares the notes by independently and uniformly selecting multiple secret strings and encoding them into the single photon states. The notes are then distributed among untrusted holders. To carry out a transaction, the holder sends the note to the honest local verifiers of the Bank. The verifier runs the local test on the holder's note and obtains the classical measurement outcomes. This is forwarded to the Bank who declares the validity of the note based on the outcomes received. The key aspects of our money scheme include: verification step requiring single round classical interaction between the local verifier and the Bank; fixed verification circuit that uses only passive linear optical components; the re-usability of each note in our scheme which grows linearly with the size of note; and an unconditional security against any adversary trying to forge the bank note while tolerating the noise of upto 21.4%. The simplistic nature of our verification scheme allows for the ability to reach a maximal theoretical noise tolerance of 25%, as conjectured by Amiri et al. [AA17] . Finally, we describe the practical implementation technique of our scheme using weak coherent states which requires only a single beam splitter and 2 threshold detectors irrespective of the size of the note. Previous schemes have required the number of optical components which increase with the note size. This considerable reduction of components in our scheme enables us to go to arbitrarily large input sizes, thus showcasing the ability to reach higher robustness experimentally, something not feasible for any existing money scheme with the current technology.
Introduction
In the 1980s, Wiesner [Wie83] proposed the idea of quantum money to create unforgeable bank notes with quantum states. The unforgeability of the note relied on the no-cloning property of quantum mechanics [WZ82] . This was incidentally also among the initial quantum cryptographic primitives to be introduced. Subsequently other cryptographic tasks have been proposed such as quantum key distribution, digital signatures, coin flipping etc [SBPC + 09, DCK + 16, PJL + 14].
beam splitters and two threshold detectors independent of the input size. This led to the first experimental realization of quantum advantage in one-way communication complexity.
The first quantum money scheme proposed here uses single photon states instead of the coherent states. The single photon encoding is the implementation of a qubit/qudit with linear optics. Thus defining our money scheme in this picture makes it more translatable to other qubit encoding pictures for experimental demonstrations. Our money scheme, while achieving a noise tolerance of 21.4%, offers much simplicity in implementation of the verification protocol, compared to the existing Hidden Matching based protocols [AA17] . In the protocols based on Matching schemes, the tolerance against the noise increases with input size of the note. Thus the money scheme becomes more robust against experimental imperfections and forging by going to higher input sized bank notes. For the schemes based on Hidden Matching, the verification protocol involves a complex circuit with the number of optical elements (active switches, delays, beam splitter) increasing atleast logarithmically with the input size. Thus it gets increasingly difficult to implement the circuit for large input sizes. This is the primary reason why the only implementation based on Hidden Matching has been shown for input size n = 4. In our SM scheme with single photon states, even though the number of linear optical components grow linearly with the input size, the optical components required are just passive 50/50 beam splitters with no need of active switch components. This considerably facilitates the implementation of our money scheme. Further more, in the second part we propose the quantum money scheme with coherent state encoding. As pointed out before, the SM scheme based on coherent states requires O(1) 50/50 beam splitters and two threshold detectors, thus enabling us to go to arbitrarily large input sizes and reaching higher robustness in our money scheme than what is currently experimentally feasible.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we define the private-key quantum money including the notions of correctness and unforgeability. In section 3 we introduce the tools required to construct our money scheme. This includes defining a modified version of the SM problem and SM scheme with single photon states. In section 4 we formally introduce our quantum money scheme using SM verification. Sections 5 and 6 analyses the security of our money scheme and prove that it exhibits an information theoretic security. Finally, in section 7 we describe the practical implementation technique of our quantum money scheme using coherent states and threshold detectors.
Definitions for Private-key Quantum Money
In this section, we go through the definitions of private-key quantum money. Informally, a privatekey quantum money scheme involves an algorithm used by a trusted entity, the Bank to produce multiple notes, and a protocol which is run between a holder H of the note and the Bank to verify the authenticity the note. The requirement for the verification protocol to be secure is that it must be impossible for an adversary note holder to create more notes than what it received from the Bank.
Definition 2.1. Private-key quantum money. A quantum money scheme with classical verification consists of an algorithm by the Bank, and a verification protocol, Verification, such that, 1. Bank algorithm produces a quantum note $ = (ρ, s.n.) where ρ is a quantum state of the note and s.n. is the classical serial number of the note.
2. Verification is a verification protocol with classical communication that is run on the note $, between the note holder H who claims to posses the note $ and the Bank. The output of the protocol is a bit declared by the Bank to denote whether the note is valid or not. We denote this final bit as Ver B H ($) which is 1 when the Bank validates the note and 0 otherwise.
For this scheme to be secure, it must satisfy two important properties,
• Correctness: The scheme is correct if for every honest holder H, it holds that
• Unforgeability: The scheme is unforgeable if for any quantum adversary who possesses m notes, has interacted a finitely bounded number of times with the Bank and has managed to produce m notes $ 1 , $ 2 , · · · , $ m , it holds that,
where H is any honest note holder. The correctness condition ensures that all the honest note holders get their note verified with an exponentially close to 1 probability (by setting exponentially close to 0). While the unforgeability condition ensures that an adversary trying to create more notes than what he had originally from the Bank, would fail with an exponentially close to 1 probability in being able to verify all the notes. Our definition includes possibility of adaptive attacks by the adversary since we allow the interaction with the Bank a finite number of times during the verification protocol.
Aaronson et al. studied the security of the full private-key quantum money scheme and deduced that it is enough to prove the security of a smaller money scheme (mini-scheme) in order to guarantee security of the full scheme [AC12] . Under this mini-scheme the Bank produces one quantum note $. The goal of the note adversary is, after finite interactions with the Bank, to produce two quantum notes $ 1 and $ 2 which successfully passes the verification test of the Bank. In this scheme, since the Bank produces only a single note $, hence it does not require an attached classical serial number.
Definition 2.2. Private-key quantum money mini-scheme. A quantum money mini-scheme with classical verification consists of an algorithm by the Bank, and a verification protocol, Verification, such that, 1. Bank algorithm produces a quantum note $ = ρ where ρ is a quantum state of the note.
• Unforgeability: The scheme is unforgeable if for any quantum adversary who possesses the note $, has interacted a finitely bounded number of times with the Bank and has managed to produce two notes $ 1 and $ 2 , it holds that,
where H is any honest note holder.
To go from a private-key quantum money mini-scheme to a full scheme, it is enough for the Bank to add a serial number to a note of the mini-scheme. Then the Bank can just run the verification protocol of the mini-scheme for that note with the serial number. We therefore propose a quantum money mini-scheme and rely on the above results to extend this mini-scheme into full scheme.
Tools for the Money Scheme
In this section we define the essential tool required for the construction of our money scheme, the Sampling Matching problem. This problem was originally defined by Kumar et al. to demonstrate quantum advantage in one-way communication complexity setting [KKD18] . We use a variant of the original problem to construct the verification scheme for the honest verifier.
Sampling Matching problem
The Sampling Matching problem as illustrated in Figure 1 consistes of two players, Alice and Bob. For any positive integer n, Alice receives a binary string x ∈ {0, 1} n . Bob, on the other hand, does not receive any input. His task is to sample a tuple (k, l) on the complete graph of n vertices (with the veritices being indexed with numbers {1, 2, · · · , n}) uniformly at random from a set of T n = n(n − 1)/2 distinct tuples. An example of the tuple set T 4 for n = 4 is shown in Figure 2 . The objective of the problem is for Bob to output any tuple (k, l) and the parity x k ⊕ x l (where x k , x l are the k th and l th bit of x respectively). We look at the model of one-way communication where we only allow a single message from Alice to Bob. 
where the from the message m(x), a tuple (k, l) is sampled from the set of possible distinct tuples T n . Bob's objective is to output the parity correctly with high probability.
For our quantum money proposal, we study the case when Alice is the untrusted note holder and Bob is an honest note verifier. In the following, we construct a scheme for Bob to sample a tuple (k, l) from the set T n when Alice sends a quantum message to Bob. We analyse Bob's scheme when the message sent by Alice is a single photon state in a superposition over n modes. (1, 2), (3, 4), (1, 3), (2, 4), (1, 4), (2, 3)
SM Scheme with Single Photon States
Sampling Matching scheme is Bob's testing scheme to sample the parity outcome of a tuple from the set T n containing n(n − 1)/2 distinct tuples. Here we look at the testing scheme when Alice's quantum message to Bob is a single photon state.
The technique is depicted as follows: When an honest Alice receives the binary string x ∈ {0, 1} n , she encodes the information of this string into a single photon state in a superposition over n different modes,
where x k is the k-th bit of the string x. The operatorâ † k is the creation operator for the k-th mode, and,â † k |0 = |1 k . Figure 3 illustrates a method to create of equal superposition state of Eq.(5) by passing the initial stateâ † |0 through the cascade of n − 1 50/50 beam splitters and adding the phase information of each bit of the input in the n modes.
Alice sends this state |x to Bob. In order to determine the parity outcome of a tuple, Bob first prepares his local superposition state,
whereb † k is the creation operator for the k-th mode withb † k |0 = |1 k . Bob's action is to apply the mode-by-mode beam splitter operation on the state |x ⊗ |β . This is illustrated in Figure 4 .
Prior to the beam splitter operation, the input of Bob is,
(−1)
where |00 = |0 ⊗ |0 . At each mode k ∈ [n], the beam splitter transforms the input operators {â † Figure 5 . This input to output mode conversion for the 50/50 beam splitter is given as, Figure 3 : Circuit model by Alice to create a single photon state in equal superposition over n modes. This is realised by passing a single photon through a cascade of n−1 50/50 beam splitters, which are then subject to a phase-shift that depends on the corresponding secret string x ∈ {0, 1} n of Alice. 
The output mode operatorÔ † of Bob after interacting with the corresponding modes of Alice is,Ô † = 1 2n
where T n is the set of all possible n(n−1) 2 distinct tuples. The output state is,
The output Eq.(10) is then observed in the photon number resolving detectors. From Eq.(9), we observe the following,
• Simultaneous single photon clicks observed in {ĉ †
• 2 photons observed in the same modeĉ † k ord † k does not reveal the parity outcome for Bob and hence results in inconclusive outcome.
From Eq. (9), we see that the probability of observing 2 photons in the same modeĉ k is,
where we have used the fact thatĉ 2
. Similarly, the probability of observing 2 photons in the same moded k is,
Over all the n modes, the probability of having 2 photons in the same mode is
In these cases, Bob does not get a conclusive parity outcome. Here he outputs the parity outcome d = ∅.
In the remaining case which occurs with probability 1 − 1 n , Bob always gets exactly two single photon clicks in two different time modes k, l ∈ [n] with the parity outcome d = x k ⊕ x l . The probability that he outputs the parity outcome of a tuple (k, l) ∈ T n and it is correct is,
whereT
is the operator corresponding to the correct parity outcome for the tuple (k, l). Note that for the incoming state |x from honest Alice, everytime Bob obtains a parity outcome, he is certain that it is always correct. Hence if Alice is dishonest and sends a state different from |x , it is enough to show that after the mode-by-mode beam splitter interaction with Bob's state |β , there is a nonzero probability for Bob to obtain an incorrect parity outcome x k ⊕x l across the tuples (k, l) ∈ T n . This forms the basis of our unforgeability test using Sampling Matching based verification.
Private-key Quantum Money Scheme
Using the tools described above, we formally introduce our private-key quantum money scheme. The scheme involves a trusted note producing entity, Bank, untrusted note holders, and trusted note verifiers. The features of our money scheme are the following:
• Verification step requiring single round of classical interaction between the note verifier and the Bank,
• Linear (in the size of the note) verification circuit size,
• Multiple note re-usability, meaning the same note can be reused by the holder a number (linear in the size of the note) of times,
• Security of up to 21.4% noise tolerance against note adversary.
We divide our quantum money scheme into two phases. First is the Note preparation phase, where the Bank chooses multiple n-bit binary strings independently and uniformly. The Bank takes each of these strings and encodes them into a single photon state in superposition over n modes. The quantum note $ is the tensor product of single photon states corresponding to all the chosen strings. This is then distributed among the untrusted holders. In the Verification phase, a note holder who wants to use his note for transaction, sends it to the verifier. The verifier randomly selects some copies of the note state (here the note consists of multiple copies, where one copy corresponds to the single photon state that encodes one n-bit string). He runs the verification protocol using the Sampling Matching, SM scheme (Section 3.2). He locally checks the statistics of the measurement outcome obtained by running the SM-scheme and compares it with what he should expect from an honest note holder. If he finds discrepancies, he rejects the note. If the note passes this test, then the outcomes from the SM-scheme are classically communicated Figure 6 : Illustration of our quantum money scheme based on the verification protocol using the Sampling Matching scheme. In the Note Preparation phase, the Bank independently and uniformly selects q n-bit binary strings and prepares single photon superposition note states $ = |x 1 ⊗ |x 2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |x q . The Bank further initializes the r register to keep a track of the number of positions in [q] where the states have been used for verification and the count register to keep track of number of verification attempts on the note. The note ($, r) is then sent to the holder. To be able to carry out any transaction, the holder sends the note to an honest verifier. In the Verification phase, the verifier selects a fraction of the q copies of the note state which have an r = 0. He creates his local state |β and applies the SM-scheme on those selected copies. The verifier sends the outcome of the measurement scheme to the Bank. Finally the Bank compares the outcomes with his secret string x j 's and outputs a bit Ver B H stating whether the note is valid or not.
with the Bank. The Bank compares these outcomes with the his private n-bit strings. If a high fraction of the outcomes are correct, he outputs the bit Ver The money scheme we use here is the quantum money mini-scheme. Under this scheme the Bank produces a single quantum note $, consisting of many copies of single photon states. The goal of the note adversary is, after finite interactions with the Bank, to produce two quantum notes $ 1 and $ 2 which successfully pass the verification test by two independent verifiers. We have already emphasized that the security against any adversary in the quantum money mini-scheme is enough to guarantee the security in the general private-key quantum money scheme with multiple notes and a classical serial number assigned to them.
We now describe the quantum money mini-scheme based on single photon states, linear optics transformations and photon number resolving detectors.
Note Preparation Phase
1. The Bank independently and uniformly chooses q n-bit binary strings x 1 , x 2 , .., x q ∈ {0, 1} n 2. The Bank encodes each binary string x j into the single photon state in superposition over n modes,
where x j,k is the k-th bit value of string x j andâ † k is the creation operator for the mode k withâ † k |0 = |1 k .
3. The Bank creates a classical binary register r and initializes it to 0 q . This register keeps the track of positions j where the states have been used for the verification.
4. The Bank creates a counter variable count and initializes it to 0. This keeps a track of the number of verification attempts.
5. The Bank sends the quantum note ($, r) to the holder.
Verification Phase
Once the Bank distributes the notes, the holder in order to be able to carry out any transaction, has to get the note verified from an honest local verifier Ver. The verification procedure is listed below.
Local testing
1. The holder gives the note $ (=: $ if the holder is honest) to Ver.
2. Ver checks the re-usability of the note by verifying that the hamming distance of r register d(r, 0 q ) T , where T is a predefined maximum number of copies in the note that are allowed for verification. If d(r, 0 q ) > T , the note is rendered useless and must be returned to the Bank.
3. Ver uniformly and randomly selects a subset L ⊂ [q] copies from the states marked r = 0. All the corresponding L copies in the r register is then marked to 1.
4. For each chosen copy j ∈ L, Ver prepares his local coherent state |β = 1 √ n n k=1b † k |0 and runs the SM scheme (Section 3.2). Hereb k is the creation operator for the mode k witĥ
5. Ver first checks if he gets 2 photon clicks in all the chosen L copies. If not, he rejects.
6. Ver counts the number of successful copies l succ , where he obtains two single photon clicks in two different modes. For these copies he outputs the parity outcome d j = x j,k ⊕ x j,l where the clicks have been obtained in times modes k and l. For the rest of the copies, he sets d j = ∅.
Ver checks if l succ
l min , where
is the minimum number of copies that will locally guarantee his acceptance of the note, where 0 1 is the security factor. Here E h [l succ ] is the expected number of copies where the honest note holder obtains two single photon clicks in two different modes when Ver runs the SM scheme.
8. Ver proceeds to the classical communication step with the Bank only when the note passes this test.
Communication with the Bank 1. Ver forwards the outcomes {j, (k, l), d j } for each j ∈ L to the Bank.
The Bank checks if count <
T |L| , otherwise the verification attempt is rendered invalid. Here · is the ceiling function.
3. For each copy j ∈ L with d j = ∅, the Bank compares the parity value d j with the secret string x j . He validates the note if the number of correct outcomes
where E h [l cor succ ] is the expected number of copies that give the correct parity outcome when the note holder is honest, and 0 δ 1 is a positive constant.
The Bank updates the count by 1.
Note: The optimal values of and δ in the scheme are determined by the forging probability of the adversary. This is explained in further sections.
Correctness
Here we compute the probability that an honest note holder fails the verification test. We use the Chernoff-Hoeffding inequality to prove our results.
We first remark that the honest note holder always passes the step 5 of the Verification phase, since he sends the entire bank note to the verifier Ver, who after performing the SM-scheme on the chosen L copies, always obtains the two photon clicks.
However, the note holder can fail the step 7 of the Verification phase if the number of successful copies, where he obtains two single photon clicks in two different time modes, l succ < l min = E[l succ ](1 − ), where E[l succ ] is the expected number of copies where Ver obtains two single photon clicks in two different modes when he runs the SM scheme, and is the security parameter chosen by Ver. Eq.(13) tells us that for each of these chosen copy j ∈ L, the probability that the verifier obtains two single clicks in two different time modes is,
Thus for L copies chosen from the holder note state, the expected number of successful outcomes by Ver is,
Using the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound, the probability that the holder fails this test is,
Now after applying the SM scheme, Ver forwards the parity outcomes to the Bank. From Eq.(9), we see that whenever Ver obtains a parity outcome of a tuple (k, l), it is always correct. Thus the the probability that the Bank obtains the correct parity outcome from an honest note holder is c = 1. This implies l cor succ = l succ . Thus the probability that the honest holder fails the verification test is,
This probability of failing goes down exponentially with , |L| and n.
Unforgeability of Bank notes
In this section, we explicitly calculate the forging probability for the adversary when he tries to duplicate the bank note $, to be able to pass the verification tests from two verifiers, Ver1 and Ver2, simultaneously. Our proof utilises the results of the proof by Amiri et al. [AA17] where the unforgeability of the bank notes is proven when the verifier uses the Hidden Matching verification scheme [BYJK04] .
Here we look at the security proof when the Bank encodes the note states as single photon superposition states. In the unforgeability proof, we assume that the adversary has in possession a valid bank note. From this valid note, he wants to create two notes that pass verification test of the verifiers, Ver1 and Ver2.
Register manipulation. First we address one forging technique based on the manipulation of the r register by the adversary. Since in each verification, the verifier chooses |L| copies and the maximum number of note verification attempts allowed by the Bank is T , hence the adversary can to set at most (T − 1)|L| of the r register to 1 before sending the note state to the verifier.
Suppose the adversary creates two notes ($ 1 , r 1 ) and ($ 2 , r 2 ) and sends it to the verifiers Ver1 and Ver2 respectively. If the adversary sets r 1 (j) = 0 and r 2 (j) = 1 for the j-th copy of the notes, he is sure that Ver2 would not select that state for verification. This way he can set at max (T − 1)|L| copies of r 1 and r 2 register to 1. In the copies where he has set r 1 = 1, he can send the bank note states to Ver2, and similarly for the copies where he has set r 2 = 1, he can send bank note states to Ver1. This results in him exactly replicating the 2(T − 1)|L| copies of the note state for both verifiers.
Adaptive forging. Let us now also consider the possibility of the adaptive attack by the adversary. Since the Bank allows at max T number of verification attempts on the note, hence the adversary can use this to his advantage by pretending to be a verifier and querying the Bank for validation of (T − 2)|L| copies (since he needs to leave 2 verification attempts, one each from Ver1 and Ver2). Suppose in the worst case scenario, the adversary completely obtains the information of the state for those copies. Thus, including the r register manipulation and the adaptive attack, he has complete information of (3T − 4)|L| copies of the note state.
General forging. Now to prove the unforgeability condition, we consider what happens in the remaining q = q − (3T − 4)|L| copies of the states sent to Ver1 and Ver2 where the adversary has no auxiliary information of the states and for which r 1 (j) and r 2 (j) are 0. Our structure of the unforgeability proof is to relate the forging probability of the adversary to the average fidelity of the remaining q states of Ver1 and Ver2 with the honest note state. An optimal attack would correspond to maximization of the average fidelity, which can be written as a semi-definite problem (SDP). Solving this gives an upper bound on the average forging probability of the adversary.
First we remark that the adversary has to send a single photon state across each these q copies to Ver1 and Ver2, otherwise he fails the step 5 test in Verification phase with certainty. Now suppose for the copy j ∈ [q ], the adversary has the honest note state,
The adversary uses this note to create two states, η x j and τ x j and sends them to Ver1 and Ver2 respectively. We consider the normalized mixed state sent to Ver1,
whereâ † k is the creation operator of the k th mode, and the normalization factor being n k=1 A kk = 1.
Ver1 now runs the SM-scheme as shown in Figure 4 . The input of the interaction of the mixed adversary state with the local state of Ver1 |β = 1 √ n n k=1b † k |0 , results in the combined mixed state,
while the output of the the state after the n-beam splitter interaction is,
Now let us look at the probability with which Ver1 observes 2 photons in the same modeĉ k ,
Similarly, the probability of having 2 photons in the same moded k is,
Over all the n modes, the total probability of having 2 photons in the same mode is
Comparing Eq. (13) and Eq. (27), we see that the total probability of obtaining 2 photons in the same mode for an adversary is the same as that for an honest note holder. Thus even for the adversarial state, Ver1 receives two single photons in different modes with a probability p 11 = 1− 1 n . Thus over the L copies chosen by Ver1, he receives on average |L|p 11 copies with 2 single clicks in different modes. This implies that the adversary passes the local step 7 of Ver1's Verification Phase test with the probability,
where l succ is the total copies where he gets single photon clicks in two different modes and l min = |L|p 11 (1 − ). Now suppose that adversary passes this test. Then Ver1 communicates the parity outcomes of l succ copies to the Bank. According to Eq.(9), Ver1 correctly outputs the parity x j,e ⊕ x j,f of a particular tuple (e, f ) ∈ T n if he operatesT = 1 2n
where, F x j = x j | η x j |x j = 1 n n e,f (−1) x j,e ⊕x j,f A ef . Now since the adversary does not know the secret string x j , instead of having the state Eq.(22), he holds the mixture η = 1 2 n x j η x j . Thus the error probability for Ver1 averaged over all possible x j values is,
where F = 1 2 n x j F x j . Similarly, for Ver2, who receives the mixed state τ x j , the fidelity with the honest note state is G x j = x j | τ x j |x j . The average error probability of obtaining an incorrect outcome is
Thus the combined average error probability of Ver1 and Ver2 is
This problem can be cast as SDP, where the objective is to find a lower bound of the combined average probability of obtaining an incorrect outcome for Ver1 and Ver2. This amounts to maximizing the average fidelityF
Amiri et al. [AA17] numerically solved this SDP for n 14 and verified that
They further conjecture that it is true for any n. Eq.(34) allows us to give a lower bound on the average probability of giving an incorrect outcome for Ver1 and Ver2.
This is the probability for a single copy j chosen by the verifier. The verifier randomly and uniformly chooses L states from the q copies of the states from the holder. Using the teleportation argument of Clarke and Kent [CK12, AA17] , it can be shown that this lower bound on error probability Eq. (35) is the same for all the L copies. This implies that the verifier's error probability for a copy remains the same, irrespective of the outcome of previous copies. Since Eq. (35) gives us a lower bound on the average error probability for both verifiers, this implies that one verifier, lets say Ver1, must definitely have an error probability e min at least
The above error probability has been calculated for q = q − (3T − 4)|L| copies. Over the remaining q − q = (3T − 4)|L| copies, since the adversary has full information of the state, his error probability is 0. Thus the average error probability for Ver1 across the l succ copies with not-null parity outcomes is,
Suppose, T |L| = λq, for some small fraction λ < 1 (for example 1/1000), then Eq.(37) is, e min ≈ 997 999
We know that if the holder is honest then the probability of him obtaining the correct parity outcomes across all the l succ copies is c = 1. From Eq.(38), we see that for the adversary, this is c adv = 1 − e min . We define the cut-off δ = (c − c adv )/2. Using the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound, the probability that adversary's note passes the test of Verification Phase by both Ver1 and Ver2 is, 
The condition c > c adv always holds as long as n > 2, hence the probability that both verifiers pass the verification test is exponentially low. Since the Eq.(34) has been verified until n = 14, the maximum error tolerance of the scheme is up to 21.4%. However, if the conjecture by [AA17] holds true, then the maximum noise asymptotic noise tolerance of 25% can be achieved with this scheme.
Quantum Money Scheme with Coherent states
In this section, we briefly describe the private-key quantum money scheme when the Bank encodes secret strings into weak coherent states instead of the single photon states. The primary reason we want to encode the note as coherent states is that it facilitates the implementation Sampling Matching in a much simpler and elegant manner. With coherent states, as shown by Kumar et al. [KKD18] , the Sampling Matching implementation requires a single 50/50 beam splitter and two single photon threshold detectors irrespective of input size of the strings. In the coherent state encoding, the Bank independently and randomly chooses q n-bit binary strings x 1 , x 2 , .., x q ∈ {0, 1} n . Each string x j is now encoded into the coherent state α x j , with an average photon number 1,
where x j,k is the k th bit value of string x j . The coherent state α x j is a sequence of n coherent pulses in n modes. The bank note is then the sequence of q coherent states,
This is then distributed among the untrusted note holders. To carry out a transaction, the holders send the note to the local verifiers. The verifier uniformly and randomly selects few copies of the note state to run the Sampling Matching scheme. In this scheme, for each selected copy α x j , the verifier prepares his local state |β = n k=1
as a sequence of n coherent pulses. This state is sequentially interacted with the selected states of the note chosen by the verifier. The interaction is via the 50/50 beam splitter. The coherent pulse modes at the input of verifier's beam splitter in k-th step are, (−1)
and the output modes are,
The output modes are fed into the single photon threshold detectors D 0 and D 1 to observe the clicks. When a coherent state |α is incident on the threshold detector, the probability of the click is given by, Figure 7 is a depiction of the sequential interaction of the coherent pulses of one copy of an honest note holder and the verifier's local state.
Let us see how the verifier obtains the parity outcomes of one of the tuples in T n from the detector clicks. The output state in Eq.(43) denotes that the detector D 0 clicks iff x k = 0 while D 1 clicks iff x k = 1. For each of the chosen copy j, the verifier will be unable to infer the parity outcome of any matching with certainty if he does not obtain single-click in atleast two time steps. This probability P(no two single-clicks) = P(no single-clicks) + P(exactly one single-click). We denote this probability by p ¬11 , Figure 7 : Sampling Matching (SM) circuit implementation using weak coherent states, 50/50 beam splitter (BS) and single photon threshold detectors. The upper arm illustrates honest holder's state as a coherent state |α x , which consists of sequence of coherent pulses. The coherent state is encoded with a random phase x ∈ {0, 1} n through the phase modulator (PM). The lower arm is used by the verifier to produce a local reference coherent state |β , consisting of a sequence of coherent pulses, with an average photon number of 1. The verifier interferes the states into the 50/50 BS and infers the parity information from the detector clicks in D 0 and D 1 . This allows him to obtain the parity outcome of a tuple in T n . The red dot in the 1 st and 3 rd time sequence denotes that the verifier observed clicks at D 1 and D 0 detectors respectively for these time steps. Thus he infers the parity outcome for the tuple (1, 3), x 1 ⊕ x 3 = 1.
where
n is the probability of observing a single click in one time step. Thus with probability 1 − p ¬11 , which grows with n, the verifier obtains two single photon clicks in the chosen state. Now suppose the verifier observes single-photon clicks in the k-th and l-th time modes in detectors D 0 and D 1 respectively. This implies d = x k ⊕ x l = 1. This enables the verifier to output the parity outcome of (k, l) ∈ T n . If on the other hand, the verifier does not obtain exactly two clicks in two different time modes, he outputs the parity outcome d = ∅.
Description of the Money Scheme
We divide our quantum money scheme using coherent states into two phases. First is the Note preparation phase, where the Bank chooses multiple n-bit binary strings independently and randomly. The Bank takes each of these individual strings to produce the weak coherent states. The quantum note $ of the Bank is the combined tensor product of coherent states corresponding to all the input strings. This is distributed among the untrusted holders. In the Verification phase, a note holder who wants to use his note for transaction, sends it to the verifier. Upon receiving the note, the verifier randomly selects some copies of the note state (here the note consists of multiple copies, where one copy corresponds to the coherent state that encodes one n-bit string). For the selected copies, he runs the verification protocol using the Sampling Matching, SM scheme (Figure 7) . He locally checks if the statistics of the measurement outcome obtained by running the SM-scheme is what he should expect from an honest note holder. If he finds discrepancies, the note is rejected. If the note passes this test, then the outcomes from the SM-scheme are classically communicated with the Bank. The Bank compares these outcomes with his private n-bit strings.
Figure 8: Illustration of our quantum money scheme based on the verification protocol using the SM-scheme. In the Note Preparation phase, the Bank independently and randomly selects q n-bit binary strings and produces note coherent states $ = |α x 1 ⊗ |α x 2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ α xq . The Bank initializes the r register to keep a track of the number of positions in [q] where the states have been used for verification and the count register to keep track of number of verification attempts on the note. The note ($, r) is then sent to the holder. To carry out a transaction, the holder sends the note to an honest verifier of the Bank. In the Verification phase, the verifier selects a fraction of the q copies of the note state which have an r = 0. He creates his local state |β j and applies the SM-scheme on those selected copies. If the note passes the local test of the verifier, he sends the measurement outcomes of the test to the Bank. Finally the Bank compares the outcomes with his secret string x j 's and outputs a bit Ver 
Note Preparation Phase
1. The Bank independently and randomly chooses q n-bit binary strings x 1 , x 2 , .., x q ∈ {0, 1} n 2. The Bank encodes each the binary string x j into the phase randomized coherent state α x j , with an average photon number 1,
where x j,k is the k th bit value of string x j . The coherent state α x j is a sequence of n coherent pulses in n modes.
10. For each copy j ∈ L with d j = ∅, the Bank compares the parity value d j with the secret string x j . He validates the note if the number of correct outcomes
11. The Bank updates the count by 1.
It is important to note that we are not providing a full security proof of our quantum money scheme using coherent states. This is due to the fact that it is usually a lengthy task, and further, the statements of security would be dependent on the specific experimental values. The main objective of this section is to illustrate the simplicity and elegance of mapping the money scheme using coherent states. Nevertheless, we expect that a full security proof can be constructed from the proof given for the single photon states.
Discussion
We introduced the private-key quantum money as the cryptographic task using Sampling Matching verification scheme. Sampling Matching scheme is an experimentally motivated framework to ease out the implementation of quantum money schemes and to achieve higher noise tolerance than what is realistically feasible with other quantum money schemes. This facilities us to go to higher note input sizes by increasing the circuit size linearly in a straightforward manner.
The scheme we have proposed has information theoretic security when the bank notes are single photon states. Towards the end we also proposed the scheme to encode the secret strings into sequence of coherent states. This provided a dramatic reduction in the number of linear components required by the verifier. Such a scheme would pave way to allow the Bank to prepare the notes with higher input strings thus achieving higher noise tolerance against any adversary.
We understand that the major challenge in quantum money is the storage of quantum states of the Bank in a quantum memory which can then be distributed to the holder. However, as emphasised before, another major issue with all the current quantum money protocols is the increasing complexity of verifier's circuit with increase in the size of bank note. Our approach precisely addresses this front.
Our approach are can also be utilised for cryptographic or verification scenarios which do not require a quantum memory and the information is sent on the fly. This is due the fact that the coherent state encoding is a tensor product of individual coherent pulses and the interaction occurs separately on each of these pulses. Hence sending the entire coherent state at once is not necessary. Rather one can send the pulses of the state sequentially since the interaction of the verifier's local pulses are sequential.
Acknowledgement
N.K. thanks Iordanis Kerenidis, Eleni Diamanti and Frédéric Grosshans for useful discussions.
